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PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN SPACE: OLD ANSWERS TO NEW 
QUESTIONS. 
Rosario Avveduto† 
Abstract: This comment critically analyzes international space law in the context 
of intellectual property. The issues explored, current and future, are at the crossroads of 
the international space legal framework and U.S. intellectual property law. The first stage 
of the analysis includes a brief history of space law, introducing the U.N. treaties on 
space activities and taking a hard look at the founding principles they enshrine. An 
analytical overview of the International Space Station Agreement follows, introducing 
the present application of space law to issues of intellectual property. This overview 
further considers the fundamental principles of U.S. intellectual property, especially 
patent law, including the peculiar mandate of the Patents in Space Act. Both preceding 
sections highlight issues specifically affecting intellectual property and its development 
or enforcement in outer space and reveal the ramifications of this complex topic. After 
dissecting the relevant legal norms, the comment explores the future of the interaction 
between space and intellectual property, building upon the preceding critical approach to 
examine two issues: orbital patents and flags of convenience for patent infringers in 
space. Having delineated a number of interpretive problems that scarcely find comfort in 
the language of the applicable law, the comment concludes that commercial development 
and innovation in outer space will either require an update of international space law 
principles or a conscious disregard of its provisions. 
Cite as: Rosario Avveduto, Past, Present, and Future of Intellectual Property in Space: 
Old Answers to New Questions, 29 WASH. INT’L L.J. 203 (2019). 
I. INTRODUCTION
Four fundamental forces shape the Universe. The existence of
everything in the Universe and the explanation of every phenomenon is 
attributable to the effects of at least one of these forces, which are: gravity, 
electromagnetic force, weak force, and strong force.1 These forces are also 
† LL.M. Candidate at the University of Washington, School of Law, Class of 2019. I would like to 
thank Professor Robert Gomulkiewicz for enthusiastically encouraging the undertaking of this project; 
fellow LL.M. and dear friend, Elena Ponte, for helping me in approaching and understanding space law; 
and the Washington International Law Journal Editorial Board and Staff for their invaluable suggestions 
and kind support. 
1  See generally What Is the Standard Model of Particle Physics, SCIENCE ALERT, 
https://www.sciencealert.com/the-standard-model. 
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referred to as interactions. They are fundamental because reduction to 
simpler interactions is not possible.2 Figuratively, space law was born and is 
evolving as the point of convergence of a different set of four essential 
forces that operate in our world: sovereignty,3 international law,4 scientific 
advancement,5 and intellectual property.6 These categorical directives have 
informed the human approach to space and will do so in the future. 
Sovereignty is the most fundamental relation between states, rooted in 
territory, population, authority, and recognition.7 It is hard to imagine future 
mass expansion into outer space without picturing some sort of third-
millennium “colonialism.”8 Not surprisingly, the first international treaties 
on space specifically focused on the issues of national ambitions and 
expansion of sovereign states. In particular, the appropriation of space struck 
the drafters as a matter of utmost importance and one in need of specific 
provisions.9 National sovereignty in outer space is formally nonexistent as a 
matter of international space law, because repudiated by the United Nations 
and not contemplated in their treaties.10 The non-appropriation principle, as 
2 See generally id. 
3 See U.N. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, art. 2, Jan. 26, 1967, 610 U.N.T.S. 8843 
(devoting a provision to this principle) [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]. 
4 See U.N. Off. for Outer Space Aff., Space Law, 
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/index.html (definingspace law as rules, principles, and 
standards of international law). 
5 See SPACE CHRONOLOGY, http://spacechronology.com/ (featuring a timeline of technical 
innovations related to space) (last visited Sept. 2, 2019). 
6 International Bureau of World Intellectual Property Organization, International Property 
and Space Activities, at 4 (2004), https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/patent-law/en/developm 
ents/pdf/ip_space.pdf (explaining how space technology is at the forefront of technical advancement and, as 
such, is the fruit of intellectual creations). 
7  THOMAS J. BIERSTEKER & CYNTHIA WEBER, STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT, at 14 
(Cambridge Studies in International Relations), Cambridge University Press (1996). 
8  See Haris Durrani, Is Spaceflight Colonialism?, THE NATION (July 19, 2019), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/apollo-space-lunar-rockets-colonialism/; see also Caroline 
Haskins, Private Space Companies No Longer Have To Follow The Law, THE OUTLINE (May 8, 2018, 2:31
 PM), https://theoutline.com/post/4469/outer-space-treaty-commerce-free-enterprise-bill-spacex-blue-
origin-boeing-lockheed-martin?zd=2&zi=yhzwuys2; see also The Colonization of Space, THE WEEK 
(Nov. 26, 2018), https://theweek.com/articles/808840/colonization-space. 
9  Matthew Thornburg, Are the Non-Appropriation Principle and The Current Regulatory 
Regime Governing Geostationary Orbit Equitable for All of Earth’s States?, 40 MICH. J. INT’L L. (2019), 
http://www.mjilonline.org/are-the-non-appropriation-principle-and-the-current-regulatory-regime-
governing-geostationary-orbit-equitable-for-all-of-earths-states/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2019). 
10  Id. 
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it currently stands, is obsolete and will not survive the impact of future 
commercial expansion.11 
International law balances out sovereignty through the 
implementation of international treaties and other legal instruments.12 It 
contains the thrust of national ambitions by promoting an organized and 
stable legal framework set to defuse tensions and encourage cooperation. 
Although international law is mature on Earth,13 it is still underdeveloped in 
terms of space law.14 In the latter capacity, it mostly serves the preventative 
and programmatic purpose of laying the cornerstone of the interactions 
between governments in space.15 International law and its space 
applications, therefore, run across parallel trajectories. Indeed, space law 
rises and falls with international law and diplomacy.16 Where space law 
adopts the pre-existing channels and legal frameworks of international law, it 
inherits its limits and flaws as well.17 
Science is the sine qua non of space exploration and research. 
Progress, as the consequence of understanding and promoting science, 
serves and improves society.18 The world as we know it is the product of that 
understanding. This is particularly true when it comes to space exploration 
and space-related scientific efforts. In the context of international space law, 
scientific advancements play an essential role and constitute a relevant 
portion of state parties’ obligations.19 The importance of science is reflected 
in the requirements in terms of funding, effort, and competence, which are 
11  Id.; see also Duncan Blake & Steven Freeland, As The World Embraces Space, The 50 Year Old 
Outer Space Treaty Needs Adaptation, THE CONVERSATION (July 9, 2017 3:54 PM), 
https://theconversation.com/as-the-world-embraces-space-the-50-year-old-outer-space-treaty-needs-
adaptation-79833. 
12  See William R. Slomanson, Fundamental Perspectives on International Law 4 (6th ed. 2011) 
(quoting Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 101 (Am. Law Inst. 
1987) (defining international law as the law regulating relations between states)). 
13  See GERRY SIMPSON et al., GREAT POWERS AND OUTLAW STATES: UNEQUAL SOVEREIGNS IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 30 (2004) (referring to the conventional origin of international law, the 
Treaty of Westphalia). 
14  See Kirsten Jusewicz-Haidle, Space Law 2.0, LIFE OF THE LAW (Nov. 24, 2015), 
https://www.lifeofthelaw.org/2015/11/space-law-2-0/. 
15  See generally Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3. 
16  See Kay-Uwe Schrogl, Space Law and Diplomacy, Eighth Nandasiri Jasentuliyana Keynote 
Lecture for the Fifty-Ninth International Institute of Space Law Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space 
(Sept. 27, 2016) at 1–2, https://iislweb.org/docs/2016keynote.pdf. 
17  See id. at 4. 
18  See Henk Wesseling, History: Science or Art?, 6.3 EUR. REV. 265, 267 (1998). 
19  See generally Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3. 
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exceedingly demanding and, therefore, point to a need for a reliable legal 
framework taking into account the specific needs of scientific research and 
technical innovation.20 
Intellectual Property (“IP”) rights generally support and assure 
a continually growing intellectual community and technological progress.21 
Creating and incentivizing a supportive environment for research and 
development is vital to space exploration.22 Without it, everything this 
comment examines would be nothing but scientific fiction. Different 
countries approach the foundational theories of IP in a different fashion, but 
the utilitarian, incentive-based theory is by far the most widely accepted.23 
Accordingly, the creation of socially valuable intellectual products would 
suffer if the creations were defenseless against misappropriation or undue 
reproduction.24 Although the role of IP in space is not different than its role 
on Earth,25 the consequences of its implementation in space might be 
significantly worse.26 In the realm of space, a dysfunctional regime of IP 
rights not only entails economic and social costs,27 but also undermines the 
successful pursuit of space exploration and settlement, as well as pushing 
forward the proximity of their achievement.28 
This comment analyzes an unsettled question resting in between these 
four fundamental aspects: how will the territorial nature of IP react to the 
development of technology for use in outer space? The inquiry is centered 
upon territoriality, non-appropriation, and private actors: with IP expanding 
towards space, it is time to entertain the possibility that territoriality and 
20  See International Bureau of World Intellectual Property Organization, supra note 6, at 23. 
21  WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, WHAT IS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY? 23 (2003), 
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/intproperty/450/wipo_pub_450.pdf. 
22  See International Bureau of World Intellectual Property Organization , supra note 6. See 
also Kimberly Amadeo, NASA Budget, Current Funding, History, and Economic Impact, THE BALANCE (J
une 25, 2019), https://www.thebalance.com/nasa-budget-current-funding-and-history-3306321 (discussing 
the extent of the ties between governmental space endeavours and national economy in the United States). 
23  See William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND 
POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 168-169 (2001). 
24  See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989). 
25  Star Wars: Protecting and Exploiting IP in Space, WORLD INTELL. PROP. REV. (Apr. 12, 
2019), https://www.worldipreview.com/contributed-article/star-wars-protecting-and-exploiting-ip-in-space. 
26  Id. 
27  See Landes & Posner, supra note 24, at 348 (exploring social costs of unreliable intellectual 
property regimes). 
28  International Bureau of World Intellectual Property Organization, supra note 6, at 4–5. 
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non-appropriation are in fact outdated constructs.29 As such, not only might 
these concepts be incapable of efficiently regulating the new wave of space 
commercialization, they may in fact slow it down.30 Issues relating to the 
viability of a territorial IP in a space that lacks an uncontroverted authority 
have already been identified by scholars and practitioners. Examples of these 
issues are the circumvention of patents in space31 and the appropriation of 
physical portions of outer space by way of patenting orbits.32 Assertion and 
enforcement of IP rights through a legal framework whose structure appears 
impervious to change can be difficult and inefficient for the proper 
development of a business dimension in space.33 Challenges arise out of the 
inherently conflicting nature of space law and intellectual property. Indeed, 
where international space law is non-territorial, uniform, and based on 
shared knowledge, intellectual property law is strictly territorial, not entirely 
uniform, and based on exclusive rights.34 
A functioning extra-terrestrial legal infrastructure for the development 
and enforcement of IP is fundamental for a healthy and productive scientific 
environment in space.35 This premise requires a critical assessment of the 
challenges faced by the legal system resulting from the juxtaposition of 
intellectual property rights to the U.N. treaties on space. The necessity of 
this effort is as current as ever.36 Since Arianespace became the world’s first 
commercial space transportation company in 1980, the world has witnessed 
the rise of commercial space actors and the gradual decline of the original, 
29  Blake & Freeland, supra note 1111. See also Malcom Davis, Avoiding a Free-For-All: The 
Outer Space Treaty Revisited, THE STRATEGIST (Jul. 16, 2018), https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/avoiding-
a-free-for-all-the-outer-space-treaty-revisited/. 
30  See Barbara Luxenberg, Protecting Intellectual Property in Space, PROC. OF THE TWENTY-
SEVENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE L. OF OUTER SPACE, 172, 172 (1984). 
31  See Adrian Taghdiri, Flags of Convenience and the Commercial Space Flight Industry: The 
Inadequacy of Current International Law to Address the Opportune Registration of Space Vehicles in Flag 
States, 19 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 405, 407 (2013); see also Theodore U. Ro, et al., Patent Infringement in 
Outer Space in Light of 35 U.S.C. § 105: Following the White Rabbit Down the Rabbit Loophole, 17 B.U. 
J. SCI. & TECH. L. 202, 212–13 (2011).
32  See Thornburg, supra note 9. 
33  See Luxenberg, supra note 30, at 175. 
34  See Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, Opening and Closing Statements; Practitioner’s Panel, Intellectual 
Property Resources in and for Space: The Practitioner’s Experience, in 32 J. SPACE L. 385, 406 (2006) 
[hereinafter IP Resources]. 
35  See Marie Weisfeiler, Patent Law in Space, B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 1, 1 (2019) 
http://bciptf.org/2019/03/patent-law-in-space. 
36  International Bureau of World Intellectual Property Organization, supra at note 6, at 4–5. 
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all-public paradigm.37 This fundamental change has reshaped the relations, 
the funding sources, and the prospects of technology in space.38 The world 
has abandoned the armaments’ race model developed during the Cold War; 
the driver of human expansion into outer space is no longer national pride or 
military supremacy.39 Rather, it is the driving force behind the vast majority 
of human activities: business.40  
From Virgin’s space tourism projects41 to SpaceX’s deployment of the 
Starlink satellite constellation to Blue Origin’s lunar landing ambitions,42 
private companies all over the globe are approaching new, mesmerizing 
opportunities. These enterprises require a significant amount of funding.43 
Investment, in turn, requires an assumption of risk offset by reasonable 
prospects of return:44 with respect to technology and innovation, IP rewards 
meritorious intellectual creations by providing potential revenue in the form 
of monopoly rights.45 Nevertheless, IP rights––as much as any other––only 
serve their purpose when enforceable. In a space where no sovereign exists, 
enforcement of IP rights is tied to extra-territorial extensions of jurisdiction 
or to old fashioned diplomacy. This creates the risk of loopholes and abuses 
threatening the protection of intellectual property.46 The ultimate purpose of 
37  Isabelle Bouvet, Certain Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights in Outer Space, at 3 (Nov. 1999) 
(unpublished LL.M. thesis, Air and Space Law Institute, McGill University) (on file with National Library 
of Canada) (explaining how the shift towards a private commercial space will happen gradually and that 
governmental entities still hold power in the form of preliminary approval). 
38  Id. at 4. 
39  Id. 
40  Loren Grush, NASA is Opening the Space Station to Commercial Business and More 
Private Astronauts, THE VERGE (June 7, 2019, 10:13 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/6/7/18656280/
nasa-space-station-private-astronauts-commercial-business. 
41  See Jon Porter, Virgin Galactic to Become the First Space Tourism Company to Go Public, 
THE VERGE (July 9, 2019, 6:47 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/7/9/20687323/virgin-galactic-
publicly-traded-richard-branson-space-tourism-profitability. 
42  Jeff Foust, Blue Origin Unveils Lunar Lander, SPACENEWS (May 9, 2019), 
https://spacenews.com/blue-origin-unveils-lunar-lander/; Caleb Henry, SpaceX Launches 60 Starlink 
Satellites, Begins Constellation Buildout, SPACENEWS (May 23, 2019), https://spacenews.com/spacex-
launches-60-starlink-satellites-begins-constellation-buildout/. 
43  See IP Resources, supra note 34, at 404; see also Porter, supra note 41 (referring to investments 
for $800 million). 
44  See Risk, INVESTOPEDIA, (July 24, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/risk.asp. 
45  See Landes & Posner, supra note 24, at 326. 
46  International Bureau of World Intellectual Property Organization, supra note 6. See also 
Luxenberg, supra note 30, at 176. 
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this comment is to indicate that, as humanity’s approach to space evolves, 
intellectual property and international laws must be ready to adapt.47 
Now that this introductory section has outlined the issues and 
questions that guide the analysis, the comment moves on to identify the 
applicable laws with respect to both space and intellectual property, 
providing an overview of the major U.N. Treaties, the ISS Intergovernmental 
Agreement, and then touching upon U.S. domestic legislation and legal 
principles. Following the survey of the primary sources of law, the comment 
addresses two particularized issues relating to IP as it interfaces with space. 
Finally, the comment presents the conclusions arising out of the analysis and 
argues that a new approach to space law is required to properly address 
ambiguities and interpretive conflicts. 
II. PAST AND PRESENT: OLD ANSWERS
A thorough examination of space law hinges upon the understanding
of its history and a survey of its most relevant bodies of law, chief among 
them the U.N. Treaties as and the ISS Intergovernmental Agreement. A brief 
mention to similar treaties, namely the Antarctica Treaties and the U.N. 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, will assist in better understanding the 
policy underpinnings of these legal instruments. The consideration of 
domestic legislations will focus exclusively on U.S. law, due to its 
paradigmatic approach in the comprehensive regulation of intellectual 
property and space activities.48 
A. A Brief History of Space Law
The dawn of legislation on space matters bears the mark of the United
Nations. In 1957, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, the first man-made 
object orbiting the Earth, thereby inaugurating the space race.49 The United 
Nations did not sit idle as space technologies sparked interest and wonder, 
and endeavored to assure that the new frontier would not be exploited for 
military purposes but rather for the sake of humanity’s advancement.50 In 
47  See Weisfeiler, supra note 35. 
48  See Jocelyn H. Shoemaker, The Patents in Space Act: Jedi Mind Trick or Real Protection for 
American Inventors on the International Space Station?, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 395, 398 (1999).  
49  Elizabeth Howell, Sputnik: The Space Race’s Opening Shot, SPACE.COM (Aug. 22, 2018), 
https://www.space.com/17563-sputnik.html. 
50  See generally Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3. 
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1958, the U.N. instituted the Office for Outer Space Affairs (“UNOOSA”) to 
serve as the space expert unit of the U.N. Secretariat, the executive arm of 
the United Nations. The UNOOSA serves the General Assembly by 
implementing its decisions and by fostering intergovernmental cooperation 
and awareness.51 In 1959, the General Assembly established another U.N. 
specialized body, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
(“COPUOS”). The COPUOS consists of a Scientific and Technical 
Subcommittee and a Legal Subcommittee, and is tasked with identifying 
legal problems related to space and devising the programs to be undertaken 
by the U.N.52  
In this capacity, COPUOS negotiated and concluded five treaties 
addressing the majority of space law matters of international relevance. 
These treaties are widely recognized as the pillars of space law.53 The first 
full-fledged international treaty on space is the 1967 Outer Space Treaty,54 
followed by the 1968 Rescue Agreement,55 the 1972 Liability Convention,56 
and the 1975 Registration Convention,57 all of which further elaborate on 
provisions contained in the Outer Space Treaty. Finally, the 1979 Moon 
Treaty,58 with only 18 parties, is considered a failed treaty because, due to its 
stringent obligations and vague wording, not a single country engaged in 
manned space missions has ratified it.59 It is noteworthy that the Treaties do 
not speak to private entities nor directly regulate their activities; instead, 
51  Roles and Responsibilities, U.N. OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFF., 
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/aboutus/roles-responsibilities.html.   
52  Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (2019), U.N. OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFF. (2019), 
http://www/unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/index.htm. 
53  Space Law Treaties and Principles, U.N. OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFF. 
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties.html. 
54  See generally Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3. 
55  G.A. Res. 2345 (XXII), annex, Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts 
and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (Dec. 17, 1967). 
56  G.A. Res. 2777 (XXVI), annex, Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by 
Space Objects (Nov. 29, 1971). 
57  G.A. Res. 3235 (XXIX), annex, Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer 
Space (Nov. 12, 1974). 
58  G.A. Res. 34/68, annex, Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies (Dec. 5, 1979). 
59  See Timothy G. Nelson, The Moon Agreement and Private Enterprise: Lessons from Investment 
Law, 17 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 393, 402 (2011). See also Michael Listner, The Moon Treaty: Failed 
International Law or Waiting in the Shadows?, THE SPACE REVIEW (Oct. 24, 2011), 
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1954/1. 
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they impose obligations on states governments or their agencies, 
officializing their dual role of space actors and supervisory authorities.60 
B. The U.N. Treaties
1. The Outer Space Treaty:
The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space including the Moon and Other Celestial 
Bodies is the master document of space law, also referred to as the Space 
Constitution.61 This is due to both the essential value of its legal tenets and 
its ratification by 109 countries as of July 2019,62 the latter making it the 
most widely accepted legal instrument in space law. The Treaty revolves 
around a number of main principles: freedom of exploration and exploitation 
of outer space, non-appropriation, peaceful use, and national jurisdiction and 
responsibility over space objects. 
Among these principles, chief is non-appropriation. Accordingly, 
outer space is not subject to national claim by virtue of sovereignty or other 
means.63 The principle follows the general premise laid out in Article I, 
stating that the exploration and use of outer space is free for all states and all 
countries should benefit from it.64 Outer space is solemnly defined as the 
province of all mankind.65 However, it has been pointed out that freedom of 
60  Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of the Legal Subcomm. on Its Forty-Eighth 
Session, Annex 3, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.2, A/5181 (2012) (reporting the discussion between the 
Soviet Union and the United States with respect to the scope of the U.N. Treaties namely, whether the 
Treaties would allow private actors free access to space or whether it should be limited to states). See also 
Berin Szoka & James Dunstan, How the U.S. Can Lead the Way to 
Extraterrestrial Land Deals, WIRED (Apr. 9, 2012, 1:58 PM), https://www.wired.com/2012/04/opinion-
space-property-rights/ (debating the inexistence of a loophole in favor of private actors based on the 
obligation of member states to the treaties to have their citizens conform to the treaties’ provisions) (last 
visited Aug. 31, 2019). 
61  See Jill Stuart, The Outer Space Treaty has Been Remarkably Successful – But Is It Fit for 
the Modern Age?, THE CONVERSATION (Jan. 27, 2017, 11:59 AM), https://theconversation.com/the-outer-
space-treaty-has-been-remarkably-successful-but-is-it-fit-for-the-modern-age-71381. 
See also Loren Grush, How an International Treaty Signed 50 Years Ago Became the Backbone for Space 
Law, THE VERGE (Jan. 27, 2017, 11:14 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/1/27/14398492/outer-space-
treaty-50-anniversary-exploration-guidelines (last visited Sept. 1, 2019). 
62  See Status of International Agreements Relating to Activities in Outer Space, UNOOSA, 
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/status/index.html.   
63  Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at 9–10 (art. II). 
64  Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at 9 (art. I). 
65  Id. 
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use and non-appropriation might, in fact, be conflicting concepts.66 Indeed, 
the argument goes that states or private actors cannot carry out “use” of 
space without laying a claim to that particular portion of space, which 
represents a central issue in the context of  asteroid mining.67 The resulting 
uncertainty has several ramifications, the most comedic of which has been 
the sale of lunar and planetary acres by the company Lunar Embassy, 
following a self-proclaimed appropriation made in 1980 by its owner.68 This 
is clearly an extreme case study, mostly irrelevant from a practical 
perspective; however, it exemplifies the great potential for 
misunderstandings and gray areas that this sector of the law harbors, other 
than highlighting states’ reluctance or inability to form a united front in 
addressing the matter.69 
Another cardinal rule within the Treaty is the categorical prohibition 
of military applications in outer space, including orbiting weapons of mass 
destruction, military installations and facilities, weapon tests, and military 
maneuvers on or around celestial bodies.70 The Treaty allows the use of 
military personnel, equipment, or facilities only for scientific purposes.71 It 
is interesting to note the interplay between this comprehensive ban and two 
recent instances of professed military applications. First is the 
implementation of one of the United States Trump Administration’s 
directives involving space, announced in March 2018, which calls for the 
establishment of a space force for the purpose of assuring the peaceful use of 
space and the defense of the United States and its allies.72 The force rises 
from the ashes of the U.S. Space Command and has earned the spotlight 
once again in August 2019, when the Administration announced its official 
66  See Thornburg, supra note 9. 
67  See Jesse Dunietz, Floating Treasure: Space Law Needs to Catch Up with Asteroid Mining, 
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/floating-treasure-
space-law-needs-to-catch-up-with-asteroid-mining/; see also Berin Szoka & James Dunstan, Space Law: Is 
Asteroid Mining Legal?, WIRED (May 1, 2012, 11:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2012/05/opinion-
asteroid-mining/. 
68  Adam Mann, Space Cases: The Weirdest Legal Claims in Outer Space, WIRED (June 1, 2012, 6:30 
AM), https://www.wired.com/2012/06/space-cases/. 
69  See Dunietz, supra note 67 (debating the different interpretations given to the 
Outer Space Treaty non-appropriation clause). 
70  Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at 4 (art. IV). 
71  Id. 
72  Marin Koren, What Does Trump Mean by ‘Space Force?, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 13, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/03/trump-space-force-nasa/555560/. 
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establishment.73  The same issue also emerged in Europe. On July 13, 2019, 
France announced the institution of a new branch of the French Airforce, 
scheduled for official establishment in September 2019.74 As noted, the 
announcement set forth an undisguised intention to implement defensive 
systems, i.e., weapons, to protect satellites or ground installations, and it 
contemplates the incorporation of said space force into the traditional air 
force.75 Given that such armed forces would operate in space in a military 
capacity, it is reasonable to interpret their presence and future activities as a 
violation of Article IV.76 
Another foundational principle of the international law of space, as 
embodied in the Outer Space Treaty, is responsibility. Under Article VI, 
parties to the Treaty are responsible for national activities conducted in outer 
space.77 Notably, the provision contemplates governmental actors as well as 
non-governmental ones, hinting at the supervisory and regulatory profile that 
states will maintain in the wake of space commercial actors.78 This 
regulatory profile is envisioned in two main forms: authorization and 
supervision. The concept of responsibility is also reflected in Article VII, 
which provides that state parties are liable for damages caused by their space 
objects or their components, both in space and on Earth.79 However, the 
provision points out that state liability defined as such will be pursued 
through diplomatic means.80 This poses challenges to the overall workability 
and precedent-setting of these provisions, especially in the context of 
intellectual property, where enforcement is key.81 
73  See Lara Seligman, One Small Step for Trump’s Space Force, FOREIGN POLICY (Aug. 29, 2019, 
4:36 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/29/one-small-step-for-trump-space-force-space-command/. 
74  See Andrew Liptak, France’s Air Force is Getting a Space Command, THE VERGE (Jul. 13, 2019), 
https://www.theverge.com/2019/7/13/20693087/france-military-air-force-space-command-president-
emmanuel-macron.   
75  Id. 
76  See Babak Shakouri Hassanabadi, Space Force and International Space Law, THE SPACE REVIEW 
(Jul. 30, 2018), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/3543/1. 
77  Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at 5 (art. VI). 
78  See Szoka, supra note 60 (asserting the obligation of state parties to have their citizens conform to 
international law, including the Outer Space Treaty). 
79  Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at 5 (art. VII). 
80  See Ann Deslandes, The Bold Future of the Outer Space Treaty, JSTOR DAILY (Aug. 1, 2018), 
https://daily.jstor.org/the-bold-future-of-the-outer-space-treaty/. 
81 Stefan Paterson & Robert Wulff, The Role of Intellectual Property in Space, SPACE TECH ASIA (Jul. 
31, 2018), http://www.spacetechasia.com/the-role-of-intellectual-property-in-space/. 
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National Jurisdiction is a concept that echoes throughout this 
comment and is indeed a main point of convergence between intellectual 
property and space law. Under the Outer Space Treaty, state parties retain 
jurisdiction and control over objects launched to space that appear on their 
registry, a special index kept by state authorities for purposes of keeping 
track of space objects.82 Ownership of objects launched to outer space is not 
affected by their presence in space or their return to Earth, meaning that 
distance from Earth or location in outer space have no bearing on the legal 
status of an object launched to space.83 This provision set the stage for the 
development of the Registration Convention and offered the first glimpse of 
a stable legal framework for space activities. However, the provision 
necessarily rests on the absence of independently launched space objects, 
i.e., objects launched outside of the jurisdiction and supervision of sovereign
states. Notably, it is unclear whether this absence is predicated on the states’
supposedly inescapable supervision powers or on the non-currency of the
issue. It is reasonable to presume that the situation will change dramatically
with the advancements of private commercial space capabilities such as
micro-satellites, which would allow space actors with relatively limited
resources to operate in space for purposes of space law.84
2. The Rescue Agreements
The so-called Rescue Agreements comprise the Agreement on the
Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects 
Launched in Outer Space. The Agreements came into force in 1968 and 
elaborated on Articles V and VIII of the Outer Space Treaty, mandating the 
formation of a cooperative regime for the rescue and return of astronauts and 
objects to their home states.85 The founding principle of the Agreements is 
simple: state parties must cooperate for the purpose of rescuing and 
recovering personnel or launched objects that incurred in an accident, 
emergency, or distress, resulting in the object unintentionally landing in 
82  Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at 5 (art. VIII). 
83  Id. 
84  Debra Werner, Small Satellites Are At the Center of a Space Industry Transformation, SPACE 
NEWS (Aug. 22, 2018), https://spacenews.com/small-satellites-are-at-the-center-of-a-space-industry-
transformation/ (discussing Aerospace Corp.’s transmission of data from a 2.5 kilogram satellite). 
85  Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at 4–5 (art. V, art. VIII); see also Frans G. von der Dunk, 
A Sleeping Beauty Awakens: The 1968 Rescue Agreement After Forty Years, 34 J. OF SPACE L. 411, 415-
16 (2008). 
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another state’s territory.86 The statement focuses on the rescue and assistance 
to personnel. Whereas astronauts in the Outer Space Treaty are loosely 
defined with no express indications as to whether the designation includes 
civilians (e.g., space tourists), the Agreements provide more clarity by using 
the more comprehensive term “personnel.”87 
3. Liability Convention
The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by
Space Objects came into force in 1972, after nine years of negotiations led 
by the Legal Subcommittee of COPUOS.88 The Liability Convention stems 
from the exigency to elaborate rules of states’ liability for damage caused by 
space objects and establish dispute resolution procedures.89 It is instructive 
to look at the definition of damage provided in the first provision of the 
Convention: damage is the “loss of or damage to property of States or of 
persons, natural and juridical.”90 The Convention provides another notable 
principle: damage caused elsewhere than on the surface of Earth by a state’s 
object triggers liability only where the state is at fault.91 Under this 
definition, states’ liability can be indirect when arising out of the actions of 
personnel for which the state is responsible.92 There are at least two features 
of interest: first, the definition of fault, and second, the extent of the 
responsibility for purposes of states’ liability. The previously defined 
“absolute” liability of state parties is in fact mitigated by Article VI in cases 
where the damaging conduct consists of grossly negligent or intentional acts 
or omissions committed by the claimant state or the natural or juridical 
persons it represents.93 The Liability Convention also specifies that a state is 
not liable for damage caused to its own nationals as well as foreign nationals 
participating in its operations.94 
The Liability Convention’s relevance within the two-headed 
framework of IP and space law rises and falls with the incorporation of IP 
86  von der Dunk, supra note 85, at 415. 
87  G.A. Res. 2345 (XXII), supra note 55, at Article 1. 
88  U.N. Off. for Outer Space Aff., Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused 
by Space Objects, http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introliability-convention.html. 
89  G.A. Res. 2777 (XXVI), supra note 56. 
90  Id. art. I. 
91  Id. art. III. 
92  Id. 
93  Id. art. VI. 
94  Id. art. VII. 
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rights within the definition of property. The sweeping definition of property 
adopted by the Convention does not seem to obviate this ambiguity. 
Moreover, further reference to other U.N. documents indicates that 
intellectual property rights are generally deemed to be a subset of property 
rights.95 The question is, therefore, whether inclusion of intellectual property 
can be inferred through a systematic interpretation of these two general 
principles. The scope of rights within the definition of property is relevant 
because the definition of damage within the Convention contemplates 
rendering the property unfit for its intended use.96 A stretched argument 
could be made in favor of intellectual property within the scope of the 
Liability Convention and, subsequently, infringement of those rights as an 
instance of liability. Following this line of thought, a space object 
developing or reproducing infringing technology in space could in principle 
deprive the originally patented technology of its intended use, thereby 
causing damage under the Convention. Regardless of the merits of the 
argument, the consensus within the legal community generally refutes the 
extension of the U.N. Treaties to IP rights and, consequently, to patent 
infringement.97 
Article IX represents an important provision for the purpose of this 
comment. The wording provides that a claim for compensation can only be 
presented through diplomatic channels.98 To complicate matters, the 
provision adds that nothing in the Liability Convention bars the pursuit of 
claims in local courts by a state or its natural or juridical persons, and that 
state claims cannot address the same damages acted upon through 
diplomatic means.99 The ramifications of this legislative choice are 
manifold. First and foremost, diplomatic intercourse is presented as the 
preferred venue for space-related disputes, possibly because of its non-
95  World Intellectual Property Organization, What is Intellectual Property?, supra note 21. 
96  See Joseph A. Burke, Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects: 
Definition and Determination of Damages After the Cosmos 954 Incident, 8 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 255, 276 
(1984) (citing W. F. Foster, The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space 
Objects, 10 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 137, 137 (1972)). 
97  See Weisfeiler, supra note 35, at 2 (citing to Juan Felipe Jimenez, Patents in Outer Space: an 
Approach to the Legal Framework of Future Inventions, 98 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 447, 456 
(2016)). 
98   G.A. Res. 2777 (XXVI), supra note 56, at art. IX. 
99  Id. 
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binding nature.100 Secondly, the adjudication of space-related claims would 
conform to concepts of international influence and comity and, therefore, be 
unfit to supplant judicial determinations.101 Finally, parallel litigation and 
behind-closed-doors settlements would hinder the development of a uniform 
“common law of space,” considering the historical and structural 
dissimilarities between the two resolution methods and their different 
precedential power.102 
The failure of diplomatic discourse does not, however, exhaust the 
procedure.103 The Liability Convention calls for the establishment of a three-
member Claims Commission, which strongly resembles an arbitral tribunal. 
Indeed, on the sides, there are two appointees to serve the respective state 
parties, and in the middle, a joint appointee to serve as chairman. The 
Commission decides the merits of the dispute and determines the 
compensation.104 At this point, however, the Convention takes a step back by 
providing that the decisions of the Commission are only final and binding 
when accepted by the parties, being otherwise merely recommendatory.105 
4. The Registration Convention
The Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer
Space entered into force in 1976. Its primary purpose was to create a system 
for the record-keeping and identification of space objects.106 This 
Convention also intended to expand the scope of the U.N. Register of 
Objects Launched into Outer Space, established in 1961, and further regulate 
states’ responsibilities related to space objects.107 
The Registration Convention holds particular value. The registration 
of a space object is, as explained infra, the necessary predecessor of the 
application of a nation’s domestic laws, including intellectual property 
100  See GERARDINE MEISHAN GOH, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 24 (2007) 
(noting that the closest approximation to a mention of a dispute settlement mechanism in the Liability 
Convention is the word “consultation”). 
101  Deslandes, supra note 80. 
102  See von der Dunk, supra note 85, at 412 (discussing the settlement of the Cosmos 954 dispute in 
what appeared to be an extra-treaty agreement). 
103  G.A. Res. 2777 (XXVI), supra note 56, at art. XV. 
104  Id. 
105  Id. art. XVI. 
106  G.A. Res. 3235 (XXVI), supra note 57. 
107  Id. 
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laws.108 The Registration Convention provides a definition of launching state 
that is fundamental in the application of legal concepts, such as jurisdiction 
and territoriality.109 A launching state is either (1) a state launching or 
procuring the launch of a space objects, or (2) a state from whose territory or 
facilities a space object is launched.110 Critics have highlighted that this dual 
identification may in fact not coincide, thereby creating confusion.111 
Indeed, these definitions might create situations in which a space objects has 
two or more launching states112 or none at all. The Registration Convention 
addresses the concern by providing that each state that qualifies under either 
of the two prongs can maintain the space object on its own registries.113 
However, the provision further recites that there can only be one “launching 
state” for the purpose of Article I; multiple launching states must jointly 
decide which one will serve that role.114 
5. The Moon Treaty
From an international law viewpoint, the Agreement Governing the
Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies is the second 
most impactful of the U.N. treaties.115 Conversely from the Outer Space 
Treaty, the relevance of the Moon Treaty derives from its unsuccessful 
adoption, which sheds light on the policy and legislative challenges that 
arise in connection with the development of uniform space governance. 
Indeed, one of the pivotal points of the Treaty is the cession of jurisdiction 
over all celestial bodies in the solar system to the authority of an 
international governing body.116 The scope of application of the Treaty 
equates the moon to other celestial bodies within the solar system––except 
Earth––as well as orbits and trajectories around the moon itself.117 It is 
unclear whether the Treaty also governs orbits and trajectories around 
108  See Ro et al., supra note 31, at 208. 
109  Id. (describing how the current territorial application of intellectual property in space relies on the 
definition of “launching state”). 
110  G.A. Res. 3235 (XXVI), supra note 57, at art. I. 
111  See Babak Shakouri Hassanabadi, Complications of the Legal Definition of “Launching State”, 
THE SPACE REVIEW (Sep. 2, 2014), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2588/1 (exploring the 
possibility of a spacecraft with three potential launching states). 
112  Id. 
113  G.A. Res. 3235, supra note 57, at art. I. 
114  Id. 
115  G.A. Res. 34/68, supra note 58. 
116  Id. 
117  Id. at art. 1. 
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celestial bodies other than the moon: the interpretive consensus favors a 
scope limited to circumlunar space.118 Notably, there exists an exception for 
celestial bodies regulated by virtue of specific legal norms; the Treaty only 
applies in the absence of sui generis agreements.119 This provision likely 
refers to internationally adopted legal norms. However, there is no express 
indication as to whether specific legal norms include multi-national 
agreements concluded outside of the vigilant eye of the United Nations. 
The Treaty further elaborates on the well-known principle of non-
appropriation by providing that the moon shall not be subject to claims of 
sovereignty or occupation.120 Unlike the Outer Space Treaty, the prohibition 
to establish property rights on the surface or subsurface of the moon extends 
to non-governmental entities as well as natural persons. Notably, under the 
Treaty, the installation of facilities or modules does not create any property 
right whatsoever in the adjacent area.121 The provision attempts to surpass 
the Outer Space Treaty in yet another fashion: Article 11 extends non-
appropriation to natural resources in place on the satellite.122 The stringency 
and apparent unworkability of the provisions, coupled with their ambiguities 
ultimately caused the Treaty’s demise.123 From this point of view, exemplary 
is another animating principle of the Treaty, summarized as the creation of 
an international regime for the governance and supervision of the 
exploitation, development, and management of the moon’s resources.124 
Clearly another source of friction, the Treaty’s experiment revealed the 
reluctance of states and the practical difficulties around the establishment of 
such an authority. 
From an IP perspective, Article 15 tops its predecessors in terms of 
relevance. The provision calls for compliance with the Treaty by conferring 
a seemingly unfettered right to inspect on all coexisting states on the 
relevant areas.125 Inspections under the norm encompass space vehicles, 
equipment, facilities, and installations. This measure, mitigated only by the 
118  Nancy L. Griffin, Americans and the Moon Treaty, 46 J. AIR L. & COM. 729, 736 (1981). 
119  G.A. Res. 34/68, supra note 58, at art. 1, ¶ 1. 
120  Id. at art. 11. 
121  Id. 
122  Heidi Keefe, Making the Final Frontier Feasible: A Critical Look at the Current Body of Outer 
Space Law, 11 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L. J. 345, 355–56 (1995). 
123  Id.; see also Nelson, supra note 59, at 401. 
124  G.A. Res. 34/68, supra note 58, art. 11, ¶ 5. 
125  Id. at art. 15. 
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requirement of reasonable advance notice, is predicated on the need to 
guarantee that the activities of other states are Treaty-compliant.126 To 
complicate matters, the provision allows every state to act independently, 
with or without the assistance of other parties, with diplomatic discourse 
being merely optional.127 To add to the confusion, the Treaty also 
contemplates a consultation procedure which, unlike inspection rights, is 
conditioned upon a reasonable belief that another state’s activities are non-
compliant.128 The provision does not address the overlap between the two 
measures and therefore points to a double standard in the requirements 
despite their substantially similar purpose. Indeed, it is unclear why an 
innocuous consultation would have to be based on a reasonable cause, 
whereas a physical inspection could be carried out deliberately.129 A non-
exhaustive answer might be found in the measures’ different purposes: 
where consultations seemingly aim at resolving disputes, inspections seek to 
determine the existence of the issue in the first place.130 The relevance of the 
provision in the context of IP will emerge in the wake of space commercial 
expansion. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine private commercial modules and 
installations on celestial bodies, below their surface, or in orbit being freely 
accessible for inspection. Considering the increasing volume of interactions 
between governments and private actors, the subjects of this obligation may 
as well be private commercial entities, with foreseeable consequences in 
terms of distrust and reluctance to open the doors to foreign inspectors who 
might also be competitors. 
The most illustrative feature of the Moon Treaty lies in the 
circumstance that not a single nation engaged in manned space missions has 
ratified it.131 The instrument has consequently gained the infamous 
designation of failed treaty.132 Concerns over the international regime 
overseeing the sharing and allotment of the Moon’s resources led to the 
demise of the project, fueled by a general distrust towards its vague 
126  Id. 
127  Id. 
128  Id. at art. 15, ¶ 2. 
129  See Keefe, supra note 122, at 356 (explaining that each state has a right to “check up” on the 
activities of other states). 
130  Id. 
131  See Nelson, supra note 59, at 402. 
132  See generally Listner, supra note 59. 
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language, prohibitive obligations, and seemingly socialist underpinnings.133 
Some scholars argue that the Treaty’s failure did not involve its scope, but 
rather its means: its hastily arranged provisions depicted an unreliable legal 
environment for the development of private space activities and thus 
discouraged support from spacefaring nations.134 
6. A Policy Note
It is not challenging to understand why the United Nations sought to
impose stringent terms on the use of space and celestial bodies, and how 
these principles still echo in the Treaties, as well as in other international 
instruments. These policies might indeed look outdated and overly 
programmatic in the eyes of the third-millennium space enthusiast. 
However, one must remember that the Cold War deeply influenced the 
adoption of these instruments.135 At the time of negotiation and adoption of 
the Treaties, space was deemed to have the potential to become the ultimate 
frontier for conflicts on the global scale.136 While businesses carried on by 
private enterprises were not a comparable concern, many believed that a 
functioning commercial environment––in the absence of the U.N. treaties––
would have required militarization of space, thereby increasing the chances 
of conflicts.137 Those concerns have now abated, hence the need to reassess 
their footprint on the future development of international space law. 
C. A Framework for International Terrotoriality: The Antarctic Treaty
It is interesting to juxtapose the Outer Space Treaty to the Antarctic
Treaty, adopted in 1959 and currently featuring 54 state parties.138 In general 
133  See Nelson, supra note 59, at 400 (citing to Kevin B. Walsh, Controversial Issues Under Article 9 
of the Moon Treaty, 6 ANNALS AIR & SP. L. 489, 496 (1981)). See also Alan Duane Webber, 
Extraterritorial Law on the Final Frontier: A Regime to Govern the Development of Celestial Body 
Resources, 71 GEO. L.J. 1427, 1436–37 (1983) (explaining how rational private actors would not want to 
invest in a such a climate). 
134  See Nelson, supra note 59, at 401 (citing to Kevin B. Walsh, Controversial Issues Under Article 9 
of the Moon Treaty, 6 ANNALS AIR & SP. L. 489, 496 (1981)). 
135  Id. at 402 (explaining how the moon treaty was attacked, among others, by free-enterprise 
enthusiasts who saw the 1970s ideology embodied in the agreement as an attack on free enterprise in 
space). 
136  See Benjamin D. Hatch, Dividing the Pie in the Sky: The Need for a New Lunar Resources 
Regime, 24 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 229, 246 (2010). 
137  Id. at 267. 
138  The Antarctic Treaty, SECRETARIAT OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY, 
https://www.ats.aq/e/antarctictreaty.html.   
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lines, both treaties strive to regulate human activity in a hostile environment 
devoid of native human population and resources to support it. Their similar 
purpose reflects similar principles, chief among them the peaceful 
coexistence of different states in these environments. Indeed, U.S. President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower specifically referred to the Antarctic Treaty in his 
proposal of Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty to the United Nations.139 
The Antarctic Treaty’s key provisions resemble those of the Outer Space 
Treaty: peaceful use of the environment, prohibition of military bases and 
activity, prohibition of nuclear weapons testing, freedom of scientific 
exploration and investigation, and interchange of scientific data and 
personnel between the parties.140 Both the Antarctic and the Outer Space 
treaties apply to geographical areas demarcated by virtue of conventional 
definitions: where Antarctica is the land and ice shelves south of 60°S 
latitude141, outer space is everything above the so-called Karman Line, 
situated at 100 kilometers above sea level. Nevertheless, the scope of 
application of the Outer Space Treaty appears somewhat harder to define. A 
first reason can be found in the fact the conventional border of outer space, 
the Karman Line, is not mentioned nor referred to in the treaty.142 Secondly, 
different authorities or nations adhere in fact to inconsistent definitions of 
the starting point of the outer space.143 Both these circumstances affect the 
clear demarcation between space and Earth and impinge on the fundamental 
question of whether space law or national law applies in a determined area 
of air space. 
The Outer Space Treaty and its Antarctic counterpart present another 
essential element of divergence; the Antarctic Treaty does not abhor 
sovereignty claims.144 In fact, the Antarctic treaty recognizes and tolerates 
appropriation by providing that no obligation under the treaty shall conflict 
with a state party’s claim on a portion of Antarctica.145 Unsurprisingly, the 
signatories of the Antarctic Treaty, namely, Argentina, Australia, Chile, 
139  Bin Cheng, The Legal Status of Outer Space and Relevant Issues: Delimitation of Outer Space and 
Definition of Peaceful Use, 11 J. SPACE L. 89, 102 (1983). 
140  The Antarctic Treaty Preamble, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.  
141  Id. 
142  See generally Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3. 
143  See generally Nadia Drake, Where, Exactly, is The Edge of Space? It Depends on Who You Ask, 
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/2018/12/where-is-the-
edge-of-space-and-what-is-the-karman-line/. 
144  See generally The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 140. 
145  Id. 
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France, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom, all had territorial 
claims on the continent––some of them overlapping––prior to the adoption 
of the Treaty.146 
It has been argued that peaceful coexistence of multiple sovereign 
claims in Antarctica is not the fruit of international treaties nor diplomacy 
efforts, but rather the absence of a sufficient incentive to engage in more 
substantial exploitation of the territory.147 Drawing from notions of law and 
economics, the hypothesis is that compliance in this case is the outcome of a 
cost-benefit analysis, which is the value of resources under the surface of the 
continent against the investment necessary to extract and exploit them.148 
From this standpoint, we can anticipate difficult days for the principle of 
non-appropriation in outer space. The faster we advance towards space 
colonization or asteroid mining, the faster we approach a cost-benefit 
analysis with respect to its resources and the ability to extract them. Where 
one side of the ledger is represented by the chance to exploit virtually 
endless resources, it is not difficult to understand the value of these 
opportunities and their potential to tip the scales in favor of disregard of 
international space law. 
D. The ISS Intergovernmental Agreement
Another international agreement sheds light and provides possible
suggestions on how to structure a proper space legal infrastructure. It is the 
International Space Station Intergovernmental Agreement, comprising a 
general agreement between the governments of the United States, Canada, 
the European Union, Russia, and Japan; four Memoranda of Understanding 
between their space agencies; and various bilateral agreements.149 
For the purpose of this comment, the analysis will focus solely on the 
Intergovernmental Agreement. The Agreement presents several features of 
interest, first among them a contractual rather than programmatic identity. 
146  The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 138. 
147  Matthew Teller, Why Do So Many Nations Want a Piece of Antarctica?, BBC (Jun. 20, 2014), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-27910375 (explaining how extraction of resources is, as of today, 
extremely difficult and prohibitively expensive). 
148  Id. 
149  International Space Station Legal Framework, EUR. SPACE AGENCY, 
https://m.esa.int/Our_Activities/Human_and_Robotic_Exploration/International_Space_Station/Internation
al_Space_Station_legal_framework. 
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Indeed, the Agreement is clearly oriented to the creation and governance of a 
partnership, and only tangentially enounces general statements of 
principle.150 The Agreement is part of a complex framework whose scope is 
broader than the mere regulation of space activities by governments, 
encompassing management, contribution or disposition of resources, and 
future evolution of the International Space Station. Notably, it represents a 
first comprehensive regulatory instrument with respect to a specific set of 
space activities, which means it is the first major legal instrument to 
interface itself with the obligations imposed by the U.N. Treaties.151 The 
Agreement represents a remarkable example of cooperative regulation of 
space that has been in force for more than 20 years.152 
As Article 1 describes it, the Agreement is a cooperative framework 
for the design, development, and operation of a civil international space 
station, to be permanently inhabited.153 There is a connection between the 
Intergovernmental Agreement and the U.N. treaties in the statement that the 
Station shall be used and operated in compliance with international law, 
including the U.N. treaties on space.154 The Agreement does not alter the 
rights and obligations of partner states as imposed by the treaties nor does it 
affect the partner states with regard to space endeavors unrelated to the 
Space Station.155 Notably, the instrument subscribes to the non-appropriation 
principle by providing that nothing in the agreement constitutes a basis for 
asserting a claim over outer space. The International Space Station 
Agreement recognizes the Registration Convention by reproducing its 
founding principle that each partner state retains jurisdiction and control 
over the modules it registers and its nationals who are onboard.156 It is useful 
to note that partner states maintain the ability to transfer ownership in the 
modules to a non-partner state or private entity, subject to concurrence by 
150  See A. Farand, The Space Station Cooperation Framework, ESA BULL., (May 1998), 
http://www.esa.int/esapub/bulletin/bullet94/FARAND.pdf (explaining how the drafters did not establish a 
set of homogeneous rules, but rather chose to deal with more mundane issues such as rules for the assertion 
of jurisdiction of partners states on their modules). 
151  Id. 
152  Id. 
153  International Space Station Intergovernmental Agreement, Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space, Rep. of the Legal Subcomm. on Its Fifty-Second Session, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2, at 3 (2013) 
art. 1, Jan. 29, 1998, TK U.N.T.S. TK [hereinafter International Space Station Agreement]. 
154  Id. at art. 2. 
155  Id. 
156  Id. at art. 5. 
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the partners.157 Even more interesting is the United States’ intent to divest its 
participation in the Station by 2025, because of the prohibitive maintenance 
costs.158 Although a NASA-free Space Station would certainly be a dramatic 
and undesirable outcome, it certainly ignites one’s curiosity to imagine the 
Station as a dynamic asset available to the highest bidder. For better or 
worse, the possibility of acquiring a stake in the use and physical modules of 
the Station supports the vision of the Agreement as a quasi-private legal 
framework, where divestible interest assumes priority over mere 
international obligations.159 
A peculiar system governs utilization of the Station by the partners. 
Every partner receives so-called utilization rights based on the resources 
they contribute.160 Resources, such as laboratories, can be user elements, or 
infrastructure elements, such as navigational software.161 This third-
millennium barter system contemplates a fixed share of use of certain 
elements in exchange for a set amount of resources.162 Partners can further 
barter or sell their allotted utilization right, freely and among each other,163 
or dispose of said rights in favor of private entities. An opportunity, this one, 
embraced by NASA for the purpose of offsetting operating expenses and 
promoting commercial engagement.164 For each proposed use, the partner 
state providing the element must determine whether the use is peaceful. This 
provision is further structured so as to minimize the risk that such 
assessment be invoked to prevent states from rightfully using the Station’s 
infrastructure.165 
157  Id. at art. 6. 
158  Corey S. Powell, The ISS Was Never Supposed to End Like This, NBC NEWS (Feb. 22, 2018, 8:09 
AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/mach/science/iss-was-never-supposed-end-ncna848771 (explaining how 
the projected cost of $8 billion went up to $90 billion over 19 years, coupled with annual operating 
expenses of $3 to $4 billion). 
159  Id. (describing the potential use of ISS modules as luxury hotel envisioned by Russian space 
contractor RKK Energia). 
160  Id.; International Space Station Agreement, supra note 153, at art. 9. 
161  Id. 
162  Id. 
163  International Space Station User’s Guide, SPACEREF 1, 16–17 (April 2000), 
http://www.spaceref.com/iss/ops/ISS.User.Guide.R2.pdf. 
164  See Grush, supra note 40 (referring to NASA June 6, 2019 Interim Directive establishing policies, 
among others, to support manufacturing, production, and marketing of commercial goods 
intended for commercial sale on Earth, https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/s170174611906
0610280_1.pdf). 
165  International Space Station Agreement, supra note 153, at art. 9. 
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Article 21 is a dense provision that substantiates the pragmatic spirit 
of the Agreement by specifically addressing intellectual property.166 In this 
sense, the Intergovernmental Agreement constitutes the present of 
intellectual property in space. The Agreement reflects the increased 
awareness of the importance of intellectual property rights that stimulate and 
reward the development of technical innovations in space.167 By reference to 
the Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization of 
1967, intellectual property within the scope of the Agreement is defined to 
include inventions, performances, trademarks, unfair competition, scientific 
discoveries, literary works, industrial designs.168 For the purpose of 
intellectual property laws, activities on the Station are deemed to occur in 
the territory of the partner state having the specific Space Station element on 
its national registry.169 For instance, if a Canadian inventor develops an 
invention in a module registered with Canada, then Canadian law will apply 
because the invention is considered developed within the territory of 
Canada.170 As far as European countries are concerned, any member state of 
the European Space Agency (“ESA”) can claim jurisdiction over the 
concerned activity in European flight elements as if it had occurred in its 
territory. In instances where more states participate in research or 
experiments, the participation of a second state does not by itself exclude the 
governing state’s exclusive jurisdiction. The wording of this provision does 
not seem to rule out a stipulation to the contrary.171 
Paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article 21 consider the peculiar position of 
partner states that are also members of the ESA. With respect to ESA 
member states that operate on the International Space Station, the possibility 
exists that their national intellectual property laws may overlap.172 The first 
provision contemplates instances in which a person or entity holds 
166  Id. at art. 21. 
167  See Rochus Moenter, The International Space Station: Legal Framework and Current 
Status, 64 J.AIR L. & COM. 1033, 1052 (1999) (outlining the nexus between an increasing international ind
ustrial cooperation in space, the future commercialization of prospective technical inventions, and the 
protection of said inventions in the context of space activities). 
168  Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization art. 2, ¶ 8, July 14, 1967, 21 
U.S.T. 1749, 828 U.N.T.S. 3. 
169  International Space Station Agreement, supra note 153, at art. 21, ¶ 2; see also von der Dunk, 
supra note 85, at 415 (referring to the system as quasi-territorial). 
170  Alexandra M. Davidson, Note, To Explore Outer Space: The Intellectual Property Frontier for 
Patents, 47 HOFSTRA L. REV. 889, 891 (2019). 
171  International Space Station Agreement, supra note 153, at art. 21, ¶ 2. 
172  See Moenter, supra note 167, at 1054. 
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intellectual property rights in more than one European state. It substantially 
bars multiple bites at the apple in the event of IP infringement on ESA-
registered modules: consequently, an act of infringement on the same IP 
rights held in different ESA countries can only lead to one recovery.173 This 
offsets the extreme applications of the principle giving ESA member states 
shared jurisdiction over conducts occurring on ESA-registered modules.174 
Notably, Article 21 Paragraph 4 also applies to acts of infringement 
generating different plaintiffs in different ESA states. In these cases, only the 
first-filed action can obtain redress. However, the provision does not impose 
the staying of subsequent proceedings, providing instead that a court may 
stay the proceeding pending the concurrent action.175 This adds to the 
complexity of multi-state litigations and causes the first-to-file rule to battle 
with courts’ efficiency and overall quality of the litigation process in the 
states involved.176 One final nuance in the provision’s terminology regards 
the difference between multiple damages awards and multiple court 
proceedings.177 Since a bar on recovery presumes a winning plaintiff, the 
owner of IP rights in different states might force the adversary to fight 
multiple instances of litigation until either (1) the venues are exhausted, or 
(2) a court awards recovery. Fortunately, these concerns are marginal in
relevance because several instruments, although imperfect, avoid abusive
practices in European courts.178 Moreover, Paragraph 5 provides a built-in,
practical solution rooted in IP licensing principles: a European partner state
cannot deny the validity of a license for purposes of defeating infringement
claims, so long as that license is enforceable in at least one of the member
states.179 Compliance with the terms of such a license in one state bars
recovery in every other ESA partner state.180 Therefore, multi-state
enforcement of the same IP rights against the same acts is limited where the
acts are in compliance with a license that is valid in a European state.
173  International Space Station Agreement, supra note 153, at art. 21, ¶ 4. 
174  Id. 
175  Id. 
176  See Paulius Jurčys, International Jurisdiction in Intellectual Property Disputes: CLIP, ALI 
Principles and Other Legislative Proposals in a Comparative Perspective, 3 J. INTELL. PROP., INFO. TECH. & 
ELECTRONIC COM. L. 174, 214–15 (2012) (discussing the differences between European systems and the 
consequences on patent litigation, especially in terms of staying orders and protective measures). 
177  International Space Station Agreement, supra note 153, at art. 21, ¶ 4 (prohibiting only multiple 
damage awards stemming from the same conduct). 
178  See Jurčys, supra note 176, at 214–15 (highlighting the recognition of foreign judgments or the 
employment of stay orders in EU patent litigation). 
179  International Space Station Agreement, supra note 153, at art. 21, ¶ 5. 
180  Id. 
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The Agreement also provides that the presence of an object in the 
territory of a partner state for the purpose of transportation to the Station or 
another partner state cannot be the basis for patent infringement claims in 
the state where the transition occurs.181 This is known as the principle of 
temporary presence, a legal fiction contemplated in several international 
legal instruments.182 Accordingly, partner states are generally free to transfer 
to the Space Station technology that would otherwise infringe the IP laws of 
other member states by virtue of entering or crossing their territory in in 
order to reach the Station. The point is seemingly to avoid the possibility 
that states with more developed space capabilities might frustrate the efforts 
of other partner states by, for instance, conditioning the use of their transit or 
launch facilities to the licensing of nationally developed technology.183 
E. The U.S. Domestic Approach
National legislators have heeded the call for a more reliable space law
legal framework, for reasons ranging from commercial incentivization to 
compliance with international space law.184 The present section’s focus is on 
national space laws and intellectual property rights, with U.S. domestic 
legislation taking the lead role, for two reasons. First, because U.S. law is 
generally considered a mature and developed environment for intellectual 
property, with roots in experience yet great potential for change, due to its 
court-based system.185 Second, because the U.S. moved early steps in the 
regulation of space legal issues, including the joint regulation of intellectual 
property and space law. The U.S. constitutes the benchmark of national 
regulations in both intellectual property and space law186 and therefore, 
represents an assessable example of the workability and challenges of such 
181  Id. at art. 21, ¶ 6. 
182  See J. Jonas Anderson, Hiding Behind Nationality: The Temporary Presence Exception and Patent 
Infringement Avoidance, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 2 (2008).  
183  Anderson, supra note 182, at 22 (explaining the origins of the temporary presence exception, 
focusing on the policy objective of eliminating the need to obtain licenses to avoid infringement). 
184 See Space Law Is Inadequate for the Boom in Human Activity There, THE ECONOMIST (July 18, 
2019), https://www.economist.com/international/2019/07/18/space-law-is-inadequate-for-the-boom-in-
human-activity-there (discussing how the presence of a pre-existing, working legal environment is essential 
to the development of new enterprises). 
185  See Steven Seidenberg, US Perspectives: US IP Law – Big Developments on the Horizon in 2019, 
INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.ip-watch.org/2019/01/23/us-ip-law-big-developments-
horizon-2019/ (highlighting several U.S. Supreme Court cases with the potential to drastically change the 
current law). 
186  See Space Law, SPACEPOLICYONLINE.COM, https://spacepolicyonline.com/topics/space-
law/#domestic (last updated June 23, 2019, 4:28 PM) (compilation of U.S. statutory space laws). 
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intertwined bodies of laws. The following section introduces the U.S. 
intellectual property regime with a focus on patent law, focusing in 
particular on the so-called principle of territoriality. An overview of the 
Patents in Space Act follows, presenting an example of national legislation 
addressing issues of IP in the context of space activities. 
1. U.S. Patent Law
As new technologies emerge and old technologies wane, courts
struggle with the limits of a strictly territorial regime of intellectual property 
rights. The Internet challenged the conventional limits of trademarks and 
copyrights and provided an indication of the judicial discomfort surrounding 
the determination of the territorial limits of IP rights.187 Following the 
diffusion of unbundled software and the extension of patents to software and 
intangible inventions, courts confronted similar interpretive issues affecting 
the territorial reach of patent rights.188 Whether related to the aerospace 
industry or not, the innovations challenging the courts share one common 
feature:  the ability to exist or operate, entirely or partially, outside national 
borders.189 It is therefore instructive to look at how territoriality has 
developed and its current status. 
The principle of territoriality, particularly dear to patent law, is a 
cardinal rule of the system. Patents are temporary monopoly rights granted 
by governments which provide an exclusive right to make, use, sell or 
import the invention they attach to. Patents are in principle granted in the 
interest of a continually expanding human knowledge and technical 
advancement: the inventor contributes its knowledge in exchange for the 
temporary, exclusive right to commercially exploit that knowledge. Patent 
rights are necessarily limited to the territory subject to the issuing 
government’s jurisdiction.190 The U.S. Supreme Court eloquently stated the 
principle in Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp: “the presumption that United 
States law governs domestically but does not rule the world applies with 
particular force in patent law.”191 It follows that transnational enforcement of 
patents is fundamentally conditioned upon either international treaties or 
187  Matthew T. Hanna, The Exclusive Economic Zone: A “No Man’s Land” for United States Patent 
Law, 5 J. L. TECH. & INTERNET 51, 53 (2014). 
188  Id. 
189  See generally Ro et al., supra note 31. 
190  Id. at 207 (citing to Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972)). 
191  Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 455 (2007). 
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multi-state portfolios192 of patents relating to the same invention.193 The 
international filing of a patent is, however, burdensome and pricey because it 
requires an individual application to be multiplied by the number of 
countries in which the inventor seeks protection.194 Uniform procedures, 
such as the one enshrined in the Patent Cooperation Treaty,195 represent a 
first step towards a more uniform patent system. However, there is currently 
no such thing as an international patent. The Cooperation Treaty merely 
established a unified filing date for purposes of priority; each application 
still needs to be pursued individually in the respective jurisdiction.196 From 
the viewpoint of developing technologies, territoriality poses one peculiar 
challenge. Considering that patent infringement under U.S. law requires an 
infringing activity in the United States,197 the question is whether 
decentralized systems and processes partially residing outside of its borders, 
including in space, fall within this scope. 
Courts initially struggled with the interpretive challenge presented by 
this issue, practicing restraint with respect to extra-territorial extensions of 
jurisdiction.198 The Federal Circuit addressed the issue in 2005, in NTP v. 
Research in Motion, holding that use of a patent claiming a system can 
infringe even when the system’s components reside abroad.199 However, the 
court also held that methods or processes, because of their sequential nature 
and because of the individuality of each of their steps, cannot be practiced in 
the United States unless each step of the method or process is performed 
within the country’s borders.200 With respect to system or apparatus claims, 
infringement occurs, even when certain components are located outside of 
U.S. territory, so long as the United States is the place where the system as a 
whole is put into service.201 Although the Federal Circuit looked at two 
factors previously adopted by the Court of Claims in Decca Limited v. 
192  Portfolios comprising patents issued in more than one jurisdiction. 
193  See Ro et al., supra note 31, at 207 (citing to Kurt G. Hammerle & Theodore U. Ro, The Extra-
Territorial Reach of U.S. Patent Law on Space-Related Activities: Does the “International Shoe” Fit as We 
Reach for the Stars?, 34 J. SPACE L. 241, 246 (2008)). 
194  Id. 
195  Patent Cooperation Treaty art. 3, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231. 
196  See Ro et al., supra note 31, at 207. 
197  35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2019). 
198  Hanna, supra note 187, at 54 (citing Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritoriality in U.S. Patent Law, 
49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2119, 2127 (2008)). 
199  See NPT, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
200  Id. at 1318. 
201  Id. 
DECEMBER  2019 PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 231 
United States, control and beneficial use,202 it ultimately adopted a slightly 
different standard that takes into account the location of the invention’s 
components and use.203 It is important to note the antithetic positions that 
Supreme Court and Federal Circuit traditionally adopt with regard to the 
statement of seminal principles in patent law; the standards in NTP and 
Deepsouth exemplify the dissimilarity in their views.204 
The meaning of the NPT holding is illustrative of the IP side of this 
comment’s inquiry. Concepts such as control and beneficial use and their 
counterparts in NPT determine the application of U.S. patent jurisdiction to 
cases where no country formally extends its law to an unregistered 
spacecraft. Their correct interpretation would allow patent holders to protect 
against infringers whose technology is partially or entirely far from the 
borders, in all cases where the technology’s overall use, service, or control 
points to the United States. This would clearly include and support the 
extension of patent laws to spacecrafts or other space objects that are not 
registered for the purpose of the Registration Convention.205 
The specific issue of patent infringement relating to technology 
operating in space appeared before the U.S. Court of Federal Claims in 
1993.206 The court addressed the issue of whether a satellite that had never 
entered the United States constituted infringing technology, where the 
satellite had been built and was primarily operated from the United 
Kingdom.207 The court held that, despite the fact that the satellite’s central 
communication link was a NASA facility in Maryland, the United States did 
not exercise sufficient control because, per Decca, no “master station” was 
present in the country.208 Therefore, the satellite could not infringe on a U.S. 
patent because its use did not take place “within the United States.” The 
court further elaborated on the control prong, reasoning that control would 
have surfaced had NASA “originated the [control] commands within the 
United States” and transmitted them directly from their facility.209 The 
202  See Decca Ltd. v. United States, 544 F.2d 1070, 1083 (Ct. Cl. 1976). 
203  Hanna, supra note 187, at 54 (explaining that where the Federal Circuit factored in the system’s 
nature and its components’ location, the Supreme Court disregarded the systems’ location as a dispositive 
factor, focusing exclusively on control and use). 
204  Id. 
205  See Ro et al., supra note 31, at 213–14. 
206  See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 197, 197 (1993). 
207  Id. 
208  Id. at 243. 
209  Id. at 242; See Ro et al., supra note 31, at 219–20. 
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decision clearly focuses on Decca’s control factors and does not consider 
any location or service factors as they were later explored in NTP. 
Issues regarding the correct definition of territoriality within the scope 
of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) have also caused concern outside the context of space. 
A paradigmatic example is the Exclusive Economic Zone. Under the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of Sea of 1982, to which the U.S. is not a 
party, the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is the area comprised between 
twelve and two hundred nautical miles from a state’s coastal baseline.210 
Under the Convention, a nation has full sovereign rights over its own 
“territorial sea,” i.e., within twelve nautical miles from its coast. A nation’s 
sovereignty diminishes drastically after that point: this is the so-called 
contiguous zone, stretching as far as twenty-four nautical miles seaward. 
Within this area, states can only enforce their laws on foreign vessels that 
have committed certain violations while within their territorial waters.211 
Commentators have pointed out to an ambiguity in the territorial 
language affecting the application of U.S. patent laws to the Zone.212 In 
particular, the question is whether U.S. economic interests in the area and 
the nation’s assertions of sovereignty over the same imply that the Zone is, 
for purposes of § 271(a), “within the United States.” Only one case 
addressed the issue. In WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp.,213 the 
infringement suit related to cable-like devices for the seismic survey of 
marine environments. The alleged infringer shipped separate components of 
the device overseas for assembly into a device indistinguishable from the 
patentee’s.214 The District Court for Southern District of Texas held that 
practicing the patented invention beyond the twelfth mile off U.S. coasts did 
not constitute make or use-based infringement because the Exclusive 
Economic Zone was not “within the United States.”215 The court explained 
that the reluctance to extend patent law to cover infringement within the 
Zone was rooted in the absence of statutory instruction, thereby hinting that 
210  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 57, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. 
211  Hanna, supra note 187, at 57–58. 
212  Id. at 60. 
213  WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 776 F. Supp. 2d 342, 347 (S.D. Tex. 2011) 
[hereinafter WesternGeco 2011]. 
214  Id. at 350. 
215  Hanna, supra note 187, at 69 (highlighting the court’s reasoning that the EEZ is not part of the 
continental United States nor is it a possession or territory of it under the definition in 35 U.S.C. § 100(c)). 
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express Congressional action would resolve the issue.216 WesternGeco also 
addressed territoriality with respect to 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), a provision 
amending the holding of Deepsouth217 in order to prevent infringers from 
escaping liability by shipping unassembled components abroad.218 The 
additional issue was whether infringers would be liable for using the 
invention assembled abroad in a way that would harm the U.S. patentee, for 
instance, by securing service contracts or otherwise competing with the 
patentee.219 
The Federal Circuit reversed the lower court and held that a patent 
holder could not recover profits because “Congress [did not intend] to 
extend the United States patent law to cover uses abroad of the articles 
created from the exported components.”220 The court reasoned that foreign 
exploitation by a defendant of a patented invention is not infringement when 
the extraterritorial production, use, or sale of the invention has no connection 
whatsoever with a domestic act of infringement.221 Accordingly, a patentee 
“cannot recover lost profits resulting from its failure to win foreign 
contracts,” even when the failure stems from a previous act of the infringer 
occurred outside the jurisdiction of the United States. In 2018, the issue 
reached the Supreme Court, which reversed the previous decision and held 
once and for all that a patentee is entitled to recover lost profits for extra-
territorial conduct provided there is a sufficient showing of infringement 
under § 271(f).222 The Court highlighted the difference between extra-
territorial conduct and damages consequential to said conduct: patent law is 
not applied extra-territorially simply because “damages occurred 
extraterritorially” as a consequence of foreign conduct.223 In other words, the 
extraterritorial propagations of domestic infringing conduct can give rise to 
lost-profits based on damages occurred abroad. As applied to space, the 
holding signifies that patent owners can recover damages caused by 
infringement in U.S. territories––including orbiting modules or 
extraterrestrial facilities––in cases where damages arise out of the 
216  WesternGeco 2011, supra note 213, at 369. 
217  Ro et al., supra note 31, at 207 (citing to Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 
531 (1972)). 
218  WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical, 953 F. Supp. 2d 731, 755 (S.D. Tex. 2013). 
219  WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical, 791 F.3d 1340, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
220  Id. at 1350. 
221  Id. at 1351. 
222  WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129, 2139 (2018). 
223  Id. at 2138. 
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subsequent use, production, or sale of the invention in the territory of other 
countries. 
2. The Patents in Space Act
This section examines a statute that has attempted to provide answers
to issues of space commercial activities involving patents: The Patents in 
Space Act of 1990.224 
The U.N. Treaties do not expressly address the applicability of 
national intellectual property laws to activities taking place entirely in space, 
as opposed to activities that partially take place on Earth.225 Nevertheless, 
such application seems to derive from the joint application of the Outer 
Space Treaty and the Registration Convention, converging on the 
proposition that each state retains jurisdiction and control over the objects it 
launches into space and their personnel.226 Jurisdiction and control include, 
for most interpreters, the extension of patent laws and thus the ability to 
grant patents for inventions developed onboard registered space objects.227 
The Patents in Space Act of 1990 sought to codify the principle through the 
injection of two short paragraphs in Section 105 of Title 35 of the U.S.C.228 
The section provides that inventions made, used, or sold in outer space on a 
space object or component under the jurisdiction of the United States are 
considered made, used, and sold within the United States for purposes of 
patent law.229  
Accordingly, U.S. domestic patent laws can reach an invention 
conceived or reduced to practice on a U.S. registered spacecraft no matter 
how far from Earth.230 By the same token, a U.S. patentee can bring an 
action for infringement of its patents based on the making, use, or sale of an 
invention on a U.S.-registered spacecraft.231 Echoes of the statute reached 
the International Space Station Intergovernmental Agreement, which 
224  35 U.S.C. § 105 (1990). 
225  WIPO Issue Paper, supra note 6 (explaining how the latter would fall within the territorial reach of 
their respective countries’ laws whereas out of space activities would escape it). 
226  See generally Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3; see also G.A. Res. 3235 (XXVI), supra note 57. 
227  Ro et al., supra note 31, at 208 (citing to Francis Lyall & Paul B. Larsen, Space Law: A Treatise 2 
(Ashgate, 2009)). 
228  See Shoemaker, supra note 48, at 405. 
229  35 U.S.C. § 105(a). 
230  See Shoemaker, supra note 48, at 418–19. 
231  Id. 
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reproduced the principle by mandating that patent jurisdiction over ISS 
activities rests solely with the country of registration of the specific module 
hosting the activity.232 The Act took upon itself to rectify a trend of 
jurisprudential rejection of the “floating island” theory, borrowed from 
maritime law: courts had begun to refuse the extension of patent law based 
on the mere registration of the vessel, with foreseeable consequences for the 
future of patent law in space.233 The statute codified the extra-territorial 
reach of U.S. patent law by broadening the definition of infringing act. It is 
open to discussion whether this represents a way to heed the mandate of the 
U.N. Treaties or to supplant what could be argued to be their omission.234 
The Act’s extension of jurisdiction is not unqualified. Three 
exceptions exist in the statute that displace the categorization of acts on U.S. 
space objects as infringing.235 The first two exceptions are relevant to the 
present analysis. Extra-terrestrial patent jurisdiction does not apply where, 
first, the spacecraft or component at issue is the object of a separate 
international agreement to which the U.S. is a party; and second, where the 
spacecraft, regardless of being subject to U.S. jurisdiction, is registered with 
a foreign country for purposes of the Registration Convention.236 The first 
exception encourages a cooperative space environment by displacing the 
extension of patent jurisdiction every time there is a sui generis agreement 
covering the spacecraft at issue. The necessity of fostering such an 
environment, at least at the international level, is dictated by order; if 
multiple countries adopted doctrines of extraterritoriality, the aggregate 
effect would be problematic.237 As one of the examples infra illustrates, the 
second exception’s key difference between jurisdiction and registration 
creates compelling interrogatives, being theoretically able to restrict the 
power of the United States to enforce patents based on a decision of the 
relevant private operator, thereby threatening to create a loophole.238 Indeed, 
registering one’s spacecraft under the law of a country different than the 
United States and practicing a patent onboard that spacecraft would not 
result in an infringing act, so long as the country is not otherwise bound to 
232  International Space Station Agreement, supra note 153. 
233  Ro et al., supra note 31, at 212. 
234  International Bureau of World Intellectual Property Organization, supra note 6. 
235  Ro et al., supra note 31, at 213. 
236  35 U.S.C. § 105. 
237  See Shoemaker, supra note 48, at 405. 
238  See Ro, supra note 31, at 213–14. 
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the United States by international agreements regarding patent recognition or 
enforcement.239 
The exceptions in § 105(a) exclude application of U.S. patent law to 
cases of infringement occurring on spacecraft or extraterrestrial modules 
registered under the laws of another country.240 Among these exceptions, the 
one centered upon registration of the spacecraft is the most relevant. Section 
105(a) apparently superseded the principles and standards enshrined in 
Decca and later expanded by NPT. These standards now only applies to 
cases where a spacecraft or component is not registered with another country 
nor is it part of a sui generis agreement.241 The necessary consequence of 
this choice, with respect to infringing acts in outer space, is that 
considerations of control, beneficial use, or overall service are now 
preempted by a formal registration of the spacecraft, creating the potential 
for a future problem of flags of convenience. Indeed, under § 105, 
technologies operating in outer space with enough connection to the United 
States would not fall within U.S. patent law so long as the concerned 
spacecraft is formally registered with another country.242 
The Patents in Space Act provides an example of domestic law in 
harmony with the principles of international space law. However, the Act 
also exemplifies that adherence to the notions of a body of law whose policy 
and wording require modernization can be problematic. Merely 
incorporating the principle that jurisdiction is based on registration into 
domestic laws, as per the Registration Convention, does not eliminate the 
challenges affecting the treaties in the first place and it might in fact 
propagate them. 
III. THE FUTURE: NEW QUESTIONS
The future of intellectual property in space is an open question. An
unaltered legal framework transitioning to the future on the back of the past 
instruments would struggle to support the development of intellectual 
property produced by booming space commercial activities.243 As pointed 
239  Id. at 218–19. 
240  Id. 
241  Id. 
242  Id. 
243  See Space Law Is Inadequate for the Boom in Human Activity There, supra note 184; see also 
Blake & Freeland, supra note 11. 
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out, the issue lies in the different nature of intellectual property and space 
law.244 The underlying policies of these laws conflict as well, making 
convergence harder;245 the application of strictly territorial intellectual 
property laws to space, which is supposedly the “province of all mankind,” 
might be problematic. 
Territoriality does not fit space activities. Territoriality is a terrestrial 
construct because it can be reasonably assessed by reference to state borders 
or other boundaries. And even then, it’s not always unequivocally. Indeed, 
where natural bounds, such as the Karman line, may be subject to 
inconsistent definitions and measurements, areas such as the Aouzou Strip 
provide an example of contrasting artificial borders resulting in armed 
conflict.246 The commercial dimension of outer space, including the 
assertion of intellectual property rights, cannot rely on territorial definitions 
that only work when supported by the consensus of the concerned parties. 
Territoriality is also incompatible with the non-appropriation principle of the 
Outer Space Treaty, prohibiting  sovereign claims or occupation: absent clear 
boundaries over certain portions of space, recourse to legal fictions and 
extraterritorial laws will become more widespread, fueling inconsistencies 
and frictions.247 The absence of a defined authority in space creates a 
vacuum of power and an incentive for unaccountable or unsupervised 
activities. It is reasonable to expect that the private space industry and state 
parties will gradually test the limits of the Liability Convention.248 These 
critiques exemplify the inability of the old answers to fit to the new 
questions posed by space law. Failure to address these questions might 
create uncertainty, and uncertainty might hurt investments, thereby slowing 
the technological progress upon which space exploration inevitably 
depends.249 
244  See IP Resources, supra note 34, at 404. 
245  See id. 
246  See generally Matthew M. Ricciardi, Title to the Aouzou Strip: A Legal and Historical Analysis, 
17 YALE J. INT’L L. 301 (1992) (providing an example of formally defined but contested and disregarded 
borderlines). 
247  See generally Ro et al., supra note 31, at 209–21. 
248  See generally Joyeeta Chatterjee, Legal Issues Relating to Unauthorised Space Debris 
Remediation, 65 INT’L. ASTRONAUTICAL CONGRESS (2014) (concluding that international space law has 
fallacies and cannot properly address accountability in the context of space debris but calling for 
responsible space behavior from private entities). 
249  See Nelson, supra note 59, at 394. 
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A. Orbital Patents: Keeping Patent Law with Its Feet on the Ground.
The practice of patenting orbits within system or process patents is an
example of situation whose regulation depends on both IP and space law. 
Navigational technologies applying orbital mechanics contribute to 
terrestrial economy and, indeed, ownership over particular orbits has been 
claimed by a number of countries in the past.250 Patents involving orbits are 
numerous, growing in parallel with the satellite industry.251 The idea of 
patenting an orbital route is far older than it would appear, owing its 
conceptualization to British writer and inventor Arthur C. Clarke.252 
Patenting an orbit, especially a geostationary one,253 poses the fundamental 
issue of precluding access to that particular portion of space with respect to 
any other entity unauthorized by the patent owner. Indeed, intellectual 
property rights, although formally exclusive, do not in principle entail the 
subtraction of anything from another person, unlike exclusive rights in a 
parcel of land.254 Despite patents’ exclusionary powers being temporary, a 
conflict with the non-appropriation principle is unquestionable. Indeed, the 
Outer Space Treaty does not define a time limit after which appropriating 
portions of space becomes unlawful; the prohibition is categorical and omni-
comprehensive.255 Whether the mandate of the Outer Space Treaty will 
ultimately be respected is a question beyond the scope of this analysis 
because it does not affect the issues as they now exist in light of the 
applicable law. 
The concept of orbital patents reverberates the debate over private 
ownership in space. Some argue that private entities are not bound by the 
Outer Space Treaty’s non-appropriation clause because incapable of 
250  See Sean Blair, Space Property: Who Owns It?, SCIENCE FOCUS (Aug. 1, 2011), 
https://www.sciencefocus.com/space/space-property-who-owns-it/ (highlighting the 1976 Bogotá 
Declaration, where several South-American countries stated that a geostationary orbit is an extension of 
equatorial nations’ airspace). 
251 We Are Just a Few Units Short of Having Five Thousand Satellites Orbiting the Earth, UNOOSA, 
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/spaceobjectregister/index.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2019).   
252  See Becky Ferreira, How Satellite Companies Patent Their Orbits, VICE (Feb. 19, 2015), 
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/pgavez/how-satellite-companies-patent-their-orbits (discussing how 
Arthur C. Clarke had imagined patented geostationary orbits in 1945). 
253  Geostationary orbits allow orbiting elements to follow Earth’s rotation while being visible at all 
times from the same point on the ground. Geostationary differs from geosynchronous, the difference being 
that the latter has various inclinations, whereas the former only rotates on the same plane as the equator. 
254  See Fisher, supra note 23, at 184 (recalling the Lockean theory of intellectual property and its 
strictu sensu non-exclusive nature). 
255  Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at 23 (art. II). 
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asserting sovereign claims and, generally, because they are not the intended 
recipient of the Treaty’s obligations.256 Therefore, the argument goes, there 
would be no issue in the private ownership of a particular tract of space that 
is claimed as part of an orbital route, whether by patent or otherwise. On the 
opposite side, some claim that the issue of physically appropriating orbits 
routes does not stand because property titles in space would need to derive 
from a sovereign exercising its powers over the “territory,” therefore private 
entities would be ipso facto crippled in their pursuit of “parcels of space.”257 
Notwithstanding the debate on ownership, the Outer Space Treaty proclaims 
the free use of space for all mankind, thus including private entities.258 
Therefore, the issue is whether patenting an orbit falls within use of space or 
whether it spills over into ownership, excluded by the 50-year old treaty. The 
exclusionary nature of patented orbits seems to tip the scales in favor of the 
latter interpretation: the AMC-14 satellite case of 2008 provides an 
emblematic example.259 A company owning a satellite abandoned its 
attempts to salvage the communications system due to the presence of a 
patent held by Boeing covering the route chosen for the satellite’s deorbit 
and return.260 Boeing refused to concede the right to practice the patent in 
order to obtain leverage in a related lawsuit, thereby sinking the satellite and 
de facto preventing unauthorized access to the specific route. 
Another instance, this one of speculative nature, can be offered to 
better exemplify the issue of obtaining exclusionary rights on an orbital 
route. Space companies are exploring, and at various stages deploying, so-
called satellite constellations.261 Constellations work as a net, wrapping 
Earth in an invisible web to a provide full coverage for communications 
services or remote sensing.262 If we assume satellite constellations’ orbits are 
256  Id. See also Adam Mann, Loophole Could Allow Private Land Claims on Other Worlds, WIRED 
(Apr. 5, 2012), https://www.wired.com/2012/04/moon-mars-property/. 
257  See Michael J. Listner, Op-Ed: A Reality Check on Article VI and Private Space Activities, SPACE 
NEWS (Jun. 6, 2017), https://spacenews.com/a-reality-check-on-article-vi-and-private-space-activities/ 
(discussing how the right of private entities to space activities is not absolute but rather derives from 
governmental concession). 
258  Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at 4 (art. I, ¶ 2). 
259  See Boeing Patent Shuts Down AMC-14 Lunar Flyby Salvage Attempt, SPACE DAILY (Apr. 
10, 2008), http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Boeing_Patent_Shuts_Down_AMC_14_Lunar_Flyby_Salva
ge_Attempt_999.html 
260  Id. 
261  See Dave Mosher, Elon Musk Just Revealed New Details About Starlink, a Plan to 
Surround Earth with 12,000 High Speed Internet Satellites. Here’s How It Might Work, BUSINESS INSIDER 
(May 16, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/spacex-starlink-satellite-internet-how-it-works-2019-5. 
262  Id. 
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patentable technology and multiply the orbital slots by the number of 
satellites––projected to be in the tens of thousands––that a single 
constellation may comprise,263 the portion of space that is claimed assumes 
relevant proportions. This clearly points to the finite number of available 
portions of space around Earth. Given that an exclusionary right’s value is 
inversely proportional to the number of alternatives available to competitors, 
would, then, the patent claim be more than mere instructions for a 
navigational system? Would it not in fact render use of that portion of space 
subject to obtainment of licenses or other compensation and, in other words, 
appropriate it? The interrogative is further contextualized by the “spectrum 
warehousing” practice adopted by a number of companies. These entities 
apply for slots of low Earth orbit not to deploy new satellites, but to 
warehouse slots for the purpose of increasing the price of their own services 
and decreasing the slots available to competitors.264 Whether by patent or 
otherwise, space is being appropriated without regard to the Outer Space 
Treaty. The question becomes whether to allow the law to follow the practice 
or endeavor to revamp a legal infrastructure that no longer serves its 
purpose.265 
By assuming for the sake of argument that a patent can exist in an 
orbital route, claiming a portion of space for use within navigational systems 
but in fact reserving use of the territory, another interrogative arises: should 
the misuse of intellectual property, or other equitable doctrines, step in and 
avoid this outcome? The doctrine of patent misuse originated in late 1800s 
as a defense against claims of patent infringement, although it was officially 
embraced by U.S. the Supreme Court in 1917.266 On that occasion, the Court 
rescinded the permissive scrutiny earlier afforded to patentees in structuring 
their business deals, and condemned the practice of tying the concession of 
patent licenses to the purchase of non-patented products.267 The Court 
263  Id. (explaining how the plans for a complete Starlink constellation contemplate nearly 12,000 
satellites in orbit). 
264  See Caroline Haskins, The Price of the Internet is the Space Race Nobody Knows About, 
THE OUTLINE (Mar. 23, 2018), https://theoutline.com/post/3868/satellite-broadband-internet-internet-space-
monopoly-spectrum-warehousing?utm_source=TW&zr=bn5idtli&zd=4&zi=o2vyo fl3. 
265 See Blake & Freeland, supra note 11; see also Athina Balta, Space Property Rights: The Winds of 
Change, ALTHINA BALTA LAW GRP. 8 (2016), http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/hlf/1st_hlf_Dubai/ 
Presentations/101.pdf (exploring the possibility of recognizing space property rights based on a modified 
theory of first-possession). 
266  See generally Motion Pictures Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). 
267  Id. 
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stressed that whatever prohibition or term the patentee decided to employ 
would be valid as long as not grounded in patent law. Since patent law gives 
the exclusive right to an inventive contribution, its reward must be 
commensurate to the object of that contribution.268 The outlined doctrine, as 
applied to the issue of orbital appropriation, poses the question: would it be 
possible to invoke misuse to avoid the inequitable result of allowing patents 
to impede access to portions of space? 
The sharp difference in contexts makes it difficult to reconcile the 
case law from the early twentieth century and the practice of patenting 
orbital routes; however, the effort is not futile. Against the application of 
patent misuse, the owner of a patent claiming an orbit could argue to have 
rights in nothing more than the orbit path as an element of the patented 
process or system. Conversely, depending on how far the equitable nature of 
the defense stretches,269 one could argue that an element of the physical 
world cannot strictly be claimed as part of a patent and therefore lies beyond 
the scope of the granted monopoly. The application of patent misuse to orbit 
will most likely depend on the specific benefit sought by the patent owner, 
and whether this benefit (e.g., prohibition of passage for the specific route) 
will be found to stem from patent law or fall outside of its scope. 
Assuming that certainty of the law and competition are the seeds of a 
thriving commercial environment, the importance of misuse exceeds equity 
and touches upon antitrust, as well.270 The AMC-14 Satellite case showed 
that orbital patents may be leveraged to restrain a competitor’s activities and 
that their powers may extend beyond the realm of the patent law. Therefore, 
antitrust might be another device to avoid or rectify the consequences of de 
facto orbital appropriation by means of patents. 
In conclusion, the Outer Space Treaty’s lexical ambiguities and 
broadly stated principles seem to impact its ability to remain the master 
document for human expansion into space.271 Indeed, with respect to the 
assertion of ownership claims in space, national domestic laws do not seem 
concerned about the old Treaty’s non-appropriation clause. As exemplified 
268  Id. at 513. 
269  See generally Daryl Lim, Patent Misuse and Antitrust: Rebirth of False Dawn?, 20 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 299 (2014) (exploring the equitable nature of the defense). 
270  Id. at 302 (highlighting the influence of antitrust doctrine on the development of patent misuse). 
271  See Keefe, supra note 122, at 357–58. 
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by orbital patents, it is imperative for international space law to consider a 
new array of problems and take a clear stand on the regulation of 
forthcoming commercial space activities, whether by abolishing the 
principle of non-appropriation or by appropriately defining its contours. 
B. Flags of Convenience: The Patent Infringer’s Guide to the Galaxy.
The evolution from a public aerospace industry model to a private one
has caused yet another relevant change: relations in or across space 
increasingly involve private entities, rather than just governments. Private 
entities will one day interact with each other in a global environment where 
the extent of national laws might be either limited or overreaching. Their 
interactions may well include instances of patent infringement related to 
inventions developed in space. How will extra-terrestrial enforcement of 
patents interface with the current spacecraft registration regime? Scholars 
have put forward for discussion the argument that territorial IP applied to 
international space law, and specifically to the U.N. Treaties, will cause an 
issue comparable to the so-called “flags of convenience.” 
The phenomenon, familiar to maritime law and admiralty 
connoisseurs, consists in the registration of a vessel under the laws of a 
country that has no relationship whatsoever with the vessel, its ownership, or 
its activities but that, on the other hand, provides favorable tax regimes or 
otherwise comparable benefits.272 A vessel so registered is therefore 
officially subject to the convenience state’s laws and jurisdiction. Given that 
the Registration Convention ties jurisdiction over spacecraft to a formal 
registration with a state’s registry, it seems plausible to expect at some point 
in the future the migration of flags of convenience from maritime to space 
law.273 The issue is far into the realm of imagination when applied to full-
fledged spacecrafts used in transportation, supply, or exploration. However, 
the perspective changes when applying the same principle to satellites or 
similar objects. It is indeed not difficult to imagine abuse of technical 
innovations intended to store, acquire, or otherwise process information 
272  See generally Why So Many Shipowners Find Panama’s Flag Convenient, BBC (Aug. 5, 2014), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-28558480 (explaining how Panama operates on an open 
registry: shipowners can often apply only and obtain advantages in terms of tax, cheap labor, and 
regulations’ enforcement).   
273  Frans G. von der Dunk, Towards “Flags of Convenience” in Space?, 76 SPACE, CYBER & 
TELECOMM. L. PROGRAM, FAC. PUBL’N 4 (Mar. 2012), 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1075&context=spacelaw. 
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through satellites registered in a country with favorable regulations. The 
issue is far more interesting in light of the cloud computing and distributed 
ledger274 technologies, which aim to disassemble and decentralize traditional 
computing, storing, and processing systems. 
Infringement and the ability to enforce IP rights depend on a nation’s 
jurisdiction over the concerned spacecraft or space module. Jurisdiction 
depends, in turn, on the nation having listed the object on its registry, a 
requirement that each “launching state” must satisfy for purposes of the 
Registration Convention.275 A country qualifies as a launching state when: 
(1) it launches the object; (2) it procures the launch; (3) the object is
launched from its territory; or (4) the object is launched from one of its
facilities.276 However, as discussed supra, the U.S. enacted the Patents in
Space Act to extend the scope of its patent laws to inventions occurring in
outer space. Commentators have speculated that, in doing so, the U.S.
created a loophole that would prevent infringement actions in the U.S. where
a company operates from a spacecraft or module that is registered in a
different country.277 Indeed, under the language of 35 U.S.C. § 105(a), the
presence of infringing technology on a spacecraft providing a service that is
used, controlled, or procured from the U.S. would not be actionable
infringement if the spacecraft is formally registered elsewhere.278 Similar to
maritime law, the presence of this loophole would encourage, in the future,
the adoption of favorable regulations by countries that are not bound to
recognize U.S. IP rights.279 These countries would be able to exploit the
economic thrust of private space commercialization by offering the
possibility to escape infringement claims at the expense of companies that
operate through spacecraft or modules registered in the United States.
Similarly, U.S. companies could outsource space launch services to overseas
partners operating in such countries to avoid regulations or other
obligations.280
The question is therefore whether U.S. courts would be able to extend 
their jurisdiction over patent infringement occurring on spacecraft formally 
274  Distributed ledger technologies are also known as blockchain. 
275  G.A. Res. 3235 (XXVI), supra note 57, at art. II, ¶ 1.  
276  See Lyall and Larsen, supra note 227, at 124–27. 
277  See generally Ro et al., supra note 31. 
278  Id., at 206–207. 
279  Id., at 219–20. 
280  Id., at 217. 
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registered in another country but effectively operating, under the case law 
standards discussed supra, “within the United States.”281 It has been 
concluded that such extension is in principle barred by 35 U.S.C. § 105(a), 
because the formal registration with another country’s registry trumps 
considerations of control and use within the United States. Nevertheless, the 
argument has been made that certain principles of international law might 
rectify such a rigid rule and extend one state’s jurisdiction over formally 
foreign spacecrafts: for example, territorial jurisdiction, protective 
jurisdiction, or the passive personality principle.282 Similarly, it is 
noteworthy that the U.S. requires every U.S. person to obtain a license for 
space activities, regardless of whether the launching, re-entry, and flight 
operations occur within the country, and thus establishing a certain degree of 
supervision over these activities.283 
It is clear that the international legal framework as it stands is 
inadequate to support the expansion of human activity in space: its vacuums 
and uncertainties are being filled by iterative domestic-law efforts that might 
one day conflict with one other, adding to the confusion and fueling the 
circumvention of obligations. The repercussions of such a rigid regime of 
registration not only affect U.S. patent law in its ability to pursue its 
underlying policy of progress and advancement, but also affect U.S. 
obligations under the Outer Space Treaty, in particular the responsibility that 
every state has with respect to its natural and juridical persons.284 Where 
some companies might seek to avoid application of U.S. patent law to 
preclude the benefit of a patentee, others might employ the tactic to exclude 
application of U.S. law in a way that would harm their interests. In both 
cases, there is potential for unscrupulous tactics, for which the United States 
would in principle be “internationally responsible.”285 
It is instructive to remember that, unlike the U.N. Convention on the 
High Seas,286 the jurisdiction over spacecraft contemplated in the Outer 
Space Treaty may not be exclusive.287 The several circumstances giving rise 
to “launching state” status under the Registration Convention might well be 
281  35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2010). 
282  Ro et al., supra note 31, at 219. 
283  Id., at 220. 
284  Id., at 221–23. 
285  Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at 3. 
286  Convention on the High Seas, art. 5–6, Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 11. 
287  Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at 5 (art. VII). 
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shared by different countries, although only one country can have the 
spacecraft on its registry for purposes of the Convention.288 Therefore, it is 
not difficult to outline the confusion and interpretive issues that arise from 
such a legal framework; not only national IP laws might conflict in an 
operative sense by creating uncertainty, they might in fact be in violation of 
a state’s supervisory obligations under the Treaties. Once again, the ultimate 
issue is determining how the international community should look at the 
Treaties. The fact that international space law and its national counterparts 
are prone to interpretive issues will potentially affect the possibility to keep 
track of and properly apportion the responsibilities of launching states and 
private space actors. Continuing to allow national laws to fill the gaps left by 
the U.N. Treaties is a half measure at best. Although it may provide answers 
in the short term, it might also lead to conflicting national laws, thereby 
incentivizing unregulated practices such as flags of convenience. 
IV. CONCLUSION
The space race has transferred from the arena of national pride to that
of private enterprise. However, the transition is far from complete, first, 
because the role of governments will be, for the foreseeable future, quite 
relevant; and second, because the only internationally relevant body of law 
purporting to regulate space activities does not directly speak to private 
entities. This points to certain fallacies in space law. The challenge for 
governments and international authorities rests in deciding whether to let a 
50-year old legal framework recede into the background, supplanted by
practice and extraterritorial domestic legislations, or whether to endeavor to
update the instrument that many consider fundamental for the future of
mankind.
The relations between IP, as an extension of private commercial 
activity, and international space law appear to be a facet of the challenge. As 
explained, the advancement of one seem to inevitably undermine the other. 
Nevertheless, solutions are being explored that would ease the relationship 
between these two bodies of law without the drawback of renouncing 
international obligations or creating an uncertain legal environment for 
pioneering space businesses. The ISS Agreement has been a successful 
288  G.A. Res. 3235 (XXVI), supra note 57, at art. II. 
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example thus far, although its markedly practical and quasi-private structure 
points to the real issue behind international regulation of outer space. Indeed, 
the foundational problem resides with compliance with and enforceability of 
international law. Relying on channels of diplomacy and treaty-making 
might indeed prove uneventful once private space transportation and 
exploration will reach critical mass, multiply, and gradually grow distant 
from national governments and their supervision. 
The U.N. Treaties do not seem fit to address new questions such as 
orbital appropriation or flags of convenience. This inability derives from 
their nature of international law instruments as well as the specific language 
they adopt. The future of commercial expansion and IP into space cannot 
rely on a legal framework that, by virtue of its omissions, outdated policies, 
and close-to-immutable nature, is unable to adapt to and overcome new 
challenges. The risks of employing such a framework without a critical filter 
include slowing down progress, hindering states’ ability to reach or enforce 
the settlement of disputes, and incentivizing unscrupulous business 
practices. 
Although revamping the U.N. Treaties is envisioned by many as the 
optimal outcome, the solution hardly addresses all the concerns. As the 
stringent obligations of the Treaties show, subjecting commercial expansion 
and intellectual property in space to a set of outdated international rules 
might in fact work against their development. As the commercial approach 
to space evolves, international space law needs to determine whether to lead 
or follow. At stake in this determination is the pace at which we will 
proceed, outwards or inwards, through the Universe. 
